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EDITORIAL

THE article in last month's magazine, from the pen of our friend Robertson, is a timely contribution on an important subject, and while we members of the "Plebs" League have no reason to enter into recriminations on the many and vexed questions which the article raises, a little discussion of the matter may not be entirely out of place in our columns. The chief points Robertson raises are: (1) Is a working-class Parliamentary Party needed? (2) Can industrial organization secure any real economic gains for the workers; (3) Is the emancipation of the workers to be brought about through political or industrial action? All these questions have been more or less prominent among the Socialist Members of the working-class movement in this country during the last few years, and have been the burning topics of discussion since the recent successful strikes. These latter events have caused many, it seems to us, to "run amok" in one direction or the other—political or industrial. Robertson, quite rightly, dismisses from the first question the present form of political working-class action, the Labour Party, to discuss the principle involved. The same thing is necessary in discussing the value of industrial action, and more especially is this so since the existing organizations, the Trade Unions, are now seriously tackling the problem of how to make their forces more efficient in industrial disputes. In doing this they will follow their own ideas, they will mould their organizations after the average understanding of their members, and the "direct and logical" plans of the advanced sections will be more or less utilized or ignored as seemeth best in their sight. If this reconstruction were to be undertaken with a full understanding of the nature of the enemy's position and forces, our work would be done; as it is, it has only just begun, and this applies equally as much to the advanced sections as to the rest of the workers. "Divide and govern" is as true of the relations of the advanced sections in the working-class movement to the rest of the movement, as it is of the relation between the capitalist and the labourer—indeed, the latter is only possible because of the former. If (oh, that if!) the advanced sections were united on a common policy—politically, industrially, and educationally—what might they not achieve!

THAT the question as to whether industrial organizations can secure real economic gains to the workers should be seriously questioned is in itself sufficient to cause food for thought. It demonstrates how little is understood of the nature of the economic forces of

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our complex society. "It is admitted . . . that, in the 'long run,' the master-class get their own back by 'speeding up' and *by increasing the cost of living.*" It is unfortunately true that this latter impression does prevail among the workers. Is it true? No! If it were all working-class progress would be impossible. If the capitalist were able to arbitrarily fix the prices of commodities, rises of wages would be a delusion and a snare. The holders of this belief forget that it brands political action also as useless. If the politicians secure the passage of legislation to improve the lot of the workers, who pays? The capitalist class! Well, if the the capitalist class pays, what is to prevent them adding the cost of the improvement to commodities? Wages have not, necessarily, anything to do with prices, as has been frequently shown in these columns. Wages may rise and the prices of commodities fall, and vice versa, as has been pointed out by Marx (see *Value, Price and Profit*, &c.) and proved by experience. We find from such statistics as are available, that wages during the last ten years have fallen, while the cost of living has risen. During the same period there has been a fall in the general rate of profit. Wages, prices, and profits are thus shown, not only as not related in the way suggested, but antagonistic. We may return to this question in a future article, for the present it is sufficient to deny that the capitalist class can control prices. So far it would seem that industrial organization is ineffective. Is this so? No! Changing methods of production, employing immense accumulations of capital controlled by giant corporations, economizing and replacing skilled by unskilled labour, intensifying competition among the workers, have left the old forms of industrial organization stranded and almost helpless. Instead of the Trade Unions being reorganized to meet the changed conditions of productions, they have been mainly engaged in fruitless struggles among themselves in demarcation disputes, or vainly endeavouring to conserve the old trade lines, now made impossible by machine labour, with its introduction of the "unskilled" worker, male and female, or engaging in individual contests within the great industries with the obsolete weapons of the dead-and-gone small industry. Luckily the Unions are waking up, and it would seem, after the recent successful strikes, that craft Unionism is to go by the board and all future disputes will tend more and more to collective effort by the Unions of an industry. Industrial Unionism, or modern fights by modern weapons, is the need of the hour. Whether the *immediate* means of securing this will be federation or amalgamation the Trade Unions alone will decide, but economic pressure will soon cause them to decide on amalgamation by industry. From now on the new Unionism will triumph, and its triumph will be

more and more sure as the workers recognize their class interests, for them to understand right is to act right. The old Unionism, plus arbitration and conciliation, has not prevented the decrease of wages during the last ten years. How the conciliation and arbitration schemes work out is strikingly shown by the following statement made by the Midland Railway in announcing an increase of wages for its employees :—

In coming to this decision the Directors have voluntarily [?] set aside THE AWARD OF EARL CROMER, which fixed the rates of wages for the majority of men now benefited until December 31st, 1913.
(*Daily Papers, November 4th, 1911*).

The new Unionism has, in a few months, July-September, secured a yearly advance of wages estimated by Mr. Keir Hardie (Aberdare, September 26th) at £10,400,000. *Wages is the fundamental fact for the worker.* The new Unionism has advanced and will advance wages and will secure better conditions of employment, it promotes action by the workers in their class interests and on class lines. In its childhood and youth it will be concerned mainly with this : in its early manhood it will add to its aims, the scientific organization of its forces for the control of production ; in its lusty manhood it will take over the control of industry in the interests of a classless society.



Is a working-class Parliamentary Party needed? Yes, certainly! Robertson is quite correct in saying that the matter cannot be dismissed merely on the question of the failure of the Labour Party to

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adopt the militant attitude many of us so ardently desire. There are many questions that can be attended to in Parliament by a strong Labour Party, which would be an economy of our forces. Such questions as the legal rights of industrial organizations, e.g., the reversal of the Osborne Judgment, which, quite apart from its effect on political action by our class, is an unwarrantable interference with the rights of the members of Trade Unions over the disposition of their funds. Of course we know the stock arguments about the infringement upon the rights of the minority. It would be just as easy to argue in favour of blacklegging by a minority of a Trade Union who might work during a strike, decided upon by the majority, because they did not believe in the strike and had voted against it. And it might be as easy or as difficult to prove that the strike was not as necessary a means to secure improved pay or conditions, or maintain existing rights, as to prove that Parliamentary action is not the necessary and logical outcome of industrial organization "Every class struggle is a political struggle," but this does not imply that the outcome of the present class struggle necessarily finds its fulfilment in the continued dominance of political society. "The working class will substitute, in the course of its development, for the old order of civil society, an association which will exclude classes and their

antagonism, and there will no longer be political power, properly speaking, since political power is simply the official form of antagonism in civil society." But sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. While capitalism lasts political society will last, and we must use it as far as is possible in the interests of our class. The more Parliament is used by us the less the opportunities afforded our enemies to use it *against* us. The Feeding of School Children, Open-air Recovery Schools, the democratization of education, protection of Child Labour, raising of the school age, to name only a few things, are to be obtained, maintained, or safeguarded by political action as a conservation of energy. These things sometimes occupy the attention of workers, particularly married folk, to the exclusion of what some might think more important questions, but in this wicked world individual and family troubles have a habit of becoming of paramount immediate importance. (And we must not forget that *we* cannot always determine our battle-ground, capitalist interests may lead us into fights upon which we have no desire to enter.) These things might be accomplishable by industrial action, but this would presuppose an appreciation of their importance by organized labour such as does not at present exist, and when this understanding does exist it would presuppose a power strong enough to enforce its will without the necessity to strike. All these measures are compatible with capitalist domination, at an advanced stage, and are yet measures in line with the revolutionary development of the working class. Political action is as necessary, and inevitable, on the part of the workers as is industrial action, the class struggle must express itself in all fields of action, he who argues otherwise fails to appreciate the lessons of history and the unity of working-class activities. *The interests of the workers are one and indivisible, industrially, politically, educationally.* To make this recognized generally by our class should be the aim of the truly-emancipated workers.



So much and yet so little has been said, but space is at a premium. Will the emancipation of the workers be brought about by political or industrial organization? We should answer by both—

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one and indivisible. Political and industrial action will, in our opinion, be but two phases of activity of one body, the organized working class. On one side perfecting its industrial activities so as to take and hold the machinery of production and distribution; on the other, perfecting its political organization for the purpose of challenging the supremacy of the master class, and seizing and controlling the State machinery to assist the peaceful, or otherwise, socialization of industrial affairs and the ushering in of the Industrial Commonwealth. In the meantime, let us use all the means to our hands to bring about that perfect working-class understanding without which progress is impossible.

IGNORANCE is, for the workers, servitude. Knowledge of our class-history and its position in Society, is essential to dispel the apathy, indifference, and hopelessness which exists among such a large section of workers. The means and methods for change will

Our Work soon be found once this is thoroughly understood by the many. This is work and enough for the "Plebs" League. Let us see to it that no effort on our part is spared to illuminate the path that Labour is to tread. We know. Let us see that others get to know, to the extent and capacity of our opportunities. Let the Central Labour College's scheme for Tutorial Classes be known, let the Correspondence Classes be known, get your Society to take up residential scholarships at the College. And above all, make **CLASS SOLIDARITY** your theme—morning, noon, and night.

F. J. C.

☛ THE MAGAZINE ☛

Unless the response to the appeal for funds, to wipe off the outstanding debt at printers, is greatly increased before Christmas, **the Magazine will have to be suspended** with the issue of the January number. The sales have increased since the August Meet, and if the outstanding debt could be cleared there need be no fear for the future, **but** the debt will otherwise swamp us. What are you going to do?

Owing to the demands on our space some articles have to be held over till next month, including that on the Central Labour College premises promised last month but not yet received at this office.

The Philosophy of Joseph Dietzgen

(Continued)

REALITY is the sum total of relations. Every quality of a thing characterizes it under a certain condition; it appears as an affect upon something and thus is actual as a relation. Dietzgen's world-conception conceives of the all as an indivisible whole. Knowledge being a description of parts, qualities and relations. There is no entire realities. No isolated entities. No things in themselves. A thing in order to be real must stand in relation to something else. Try even to imagine a "thing in itself," it would be equal to non-existence, it would represent a something without being. Haeckel, with credit, has proved to us the knowable phenomena of his fundamental substance. Yet, priest-like, declares there is still the "the thing in itself" behind these knowable phenomena. It is evident such duality which has crept into Haeckel's position has been inherited from mediæval scholasticism. It belongs to a mode of thinking, not to the universal facts themselves. The error is

clear enough. The properties of Haeckel's fundamental substance are in truth qualities, and we know what it is as soon as we know the sum-total of all its qualities. To talk, and assume of essences at the back of understood qualities is to enter on the road of metaphysics. A subject which has been well compared to a blind man, in a dark room, looking for a dark hat, the hat in question not being there. Having, as far as space will allow, made a few remarks on Haeckel's great enigma, I pass on to compare the position of Prof. Lester Ward, with the principles held by Dietzgen.

The following passages are taken from Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* In Vol. i., p. 222, he says :—"The acceptance of the materialistic hypothesis needs no further apology than to say it appears to bear the strongest mark of inherent verity." "Besides matter itself, only the relations of matter can be conceived to exist. The most important relation of matter is motion, that is, change of its parts in space." "The two categories embrace all conceivable or possible phenomena." On p. 224, "What is matter? A definition of matter is impossible. Matter is the final limit in the definition of everything else. When we have said that matter is what it appears to be, we have defined it as far as it admits of definition" (p. 230). "The only reality is matter. It alone has an independent possible existence" (p. 299). "The force of gravitation is another mode of manifestation of some universal material substance. . . . In what manner this universal force operates to produce the effects which we constantly perceive is not yet, and may never be known." Now, even if we did accept the position as held by Prof. L. Ward, we are still left in the tents of enigma as to explanations of natural phenomena. And without explanations we can have no positive world-conception. To say that "a definition of matter is impossible," and then add, "the only reality is matter," is surely locking the avenues of human understanding, branding knowledge as vain, and degrading science to an empty conceit of a deluded brain. Where is the weakness? Prof. Lester Ward identifies reality with material existence. Yet, it is pretty evident that the term matter cannot be used as an exhaustive term for all that is real, as we saw when dealing with the qualities of existence. Matter, force, and form are abstract terms used for comprehending the phenomena—the appearance—of the world. Reality being one indivisible whole, matter, motion, and form, are general terms denoting certain properties, none of which exists in and of itself. Failure to recognize this unitary principle, and the attempts to explain all phenomena from one single principle has caused much of our confusion in the domain of philosophy. That feature of a thing which we call its matter constitutes its reality. Yet, not only is forceless matter a nonentity, but every particle of matter must appear in some special form. Starting from the conservation of energy and the indestructibility of matter, form and

changeability of form make evolution possible. Every act of causation is a change of form. The form of a thing, of a motion, or of a process, makes the thing that which it is. The term denoting a certain thing is used to comprehend the unity of all its separate parts which together make a new quality of existence. Take away from this new quality of existence its separate parts, and the term which has stood for the real thing is only an empty word—the idea of the thing. Prof. Lester Ward has failed to understand "matter," because he looks at it as having an independent existence; having an independent existence it is mysterious—inscrutable and unknowable—yet, understood in its universal interconnexion, it can be ascertained perfectly well. The idea of matter is the generalization for all properties possessing mass and volume, thus it is much simpler than the idea of any single substance, because it excludes special or individual features of material bodies. If logic teaches anything, it is that, the wider the extent of an idea is the poorer must be its content. The widest generalizations are the emptiest of real concrete information.

If you turn to Prof. Lester Ward's explanation of Gravitation from a material substance, you will at once observe he is landed into the same enigmas and confusion. Instead of shedding any light on the subject, he is forced to conclude:— "In what manner this universal force operates to produce the effects which we constantly perceive is not yet, and may never be known." Now let us be perfectly clear, "*a law of science is only a summing up of the way in which things are done, not a force compelling them to obey.*" Cause and effect are never objects or things. Cause and effect form a chain of alterations and arrangements of things. The premise of thought being the existing natural and objective reality of the universe. The law of causality is necessary to the human mind as one of its forms of explanation. As Dietzgen has it, "Causes are mental generalizations of perceptible changes" (p. 117). The law of gravitation, so-called, is a descriptive formula which states the mode of action which things of a definite quality will take under certain conditions. That which makes a stone fall when thrown into the air, or human beings keep to the ground instead of flying off at a tangent, is their inherent quality of being, plus their position in the universe—*i.e.*, the mass of the earth. Gravity is a quality that always exists, being in and with things. Abstract gravity, in and of itself, would be a non-entity. There is no metaphysical or theological power that forces things—animate or inanimate—to pursue a certain course. All things act by intrinsic necessity on account of the inherent qualities which constitute them. In other words, we have the determinedness of events by the nature of the things in action. Gravitation is not an entity you can bottle for inspection, it is a quality co-existent with things; a principle of explanation. A stone while falling is not obedient to any law outside of it; but acts according to its nature.

The same applies to the laws of ether, electricity, heredity, &c., to us they are real simply by their relations. Existence must in some way be manifest. The law of gravitation enables us to describe certain phenomena (appearances in nature) of motion in the most simple and comprehensive way. True, scientists are still investigating for clearer comprehensions, but, whatever their findings—and this applies to all branches of knowledge—it is bound to come under Dietzgen's systematic plan. Truth cannot be contradictory. The further modern science progresses the more is the unitary conception of existence realized—the unification of knowledge out of experiences. The comparisons I have made but indicate the method of monistic analysis on a few fundamental problems. But its message stretches beyond formulating notions of nature in exact statements. It touches the basis of our very existence in human society. It throws light upon all the provinces of human exertion. If I have stimulated a desire to absorb the philosophy of Dietzgen until it exudes through the skin, the aim with which I set out will have been attained.

EBBY EDWARDS.

Central Labour College Correspondence Classes.—We are asked to announce that the fees in future will be as follows: Entrance fee, 1/-; and 1/- for each essay or set of exercises. There will be no reduction in the case of classes, the secretaries of such will, as hitherto, pay no fee for the correction of their work.

Ethics and Socialism

BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK

(Continued)

Historical Materialism

WE shall here pass by the different systems and views which have followed the philosophy of Kant, and proceed straight away to the revolution which the teachings of Marx have produced in the mental and social sciences. All former conceptions considered the bourgeois form of society as the normal and rational form, and all the prevalent ideas and institutions therein as natural and obvious. Therefore a connexion between these natural things could not be recognized. One had a "natural" order of society and a "natural" Ethics, but one also had a "natural" sun which every day rose and set, and one could equally as well connect Ethics with the sun as with Society. Indeed Kant did connect it with the heavens, with the metaphysical world. A knowledge of the material connexions could only be arrived at after a comparison of the different moral conceptions of different forms of Society.

The idea that history represented an evolution of Society was not new, but Marx was the first to give this conception a firm foundation, a solid basis, disclosing at the same time the mechanism of this development. He demonstrated how the evolution of Society has its basis in the development of the forces of production, also how class-antagonisms and the class struggle are the levers which influence and propel social adjustments. Since Marx, one also knows that the bourgeois form of Society is only one of the many forms which have preceded and will succeed this particular form, and that the bourgeois ideas and conceptions which formerly passed as being the only rational ideas and conceptions represent only the particular conception of the ruling class in this Society, and are most closely connected with their particular interests. In general, in a society composed of classes with opposing interests, very different moral conceptions will exist; the conceptions of men are determined by the relations wherein which they live, thus primarily through the particular condition and circumstances of the class to which they belong. Above all, that becomes accepted as good or evil which is beneficial or detrimental to the interest of their class.

For the correctness of this statement one is able to produce those practical examples which Marx so clearly foresaw and taught over half a century ago, and which have now already become matters of fact in the modern labour movement, and one need only draw upon the experience of the labour movement to put the matter to the test. To-day we have two classes with opposed interests, and we find here in reality different moral conceptions. The bourgeoisie—there may be individuals who lay aside the general class-interest for their own self-interest—consider all that is useful and necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of the process of production and exploitation as good and praiseworthy, such as: peace, quietness, lawfulness, honour and truth in trade and commerce, spirit of enterprise, activity and energy, &c., among their own class; contentment, obedience, industriousness and modesty, &c., among the workers. And when the interests of their profits come into conflict with the interests of the bourgeoisie of another land, they even translate the war conducted for the protection of those interests into patriotism and heroism, into virtue of the highest kind. The fighting proletariat has but little respect for these virtues, as they are of but secondary importance to him, indeed they often hinder him in his struggle for freedom. To the proletariat the highest virtue is all which is necessary and useful to him in the struggle which he wages for his existence; solidarity, subordination of the individual to the organization, independence and refractoriness and submission in the interests of this struggle. This antagonism of ethical conceptions is quite obvious in important social struggles. In Holland there suddenly occurred, in 1903, a strike of the railway workers, who were commanded to transport blackleg labour to take the place of the Amsterdam dockers then on strike. Thus they were forced to select one of two choices, either to

fight against the powerful private interests which control the railways in Holland, a fight which in the ordinary course of events would seriously damage their own interests, or they had to put an end to the dock workers' strike at Amsterdam. They selected the first, and for a whole day communication was at a standstill in the western provinces. If one inquired of the bourgeoisie their opinion thereof, one would hear expressions of disgust and indignation that the whole of Society should be brought into a state of anarchy merely for the sake of the private interests of a few people. Their action was considered even criminal by the Government; to the bourgeoisie it was a crime that "Order," that is, that the usually calm and uninterrupted process of profit-making, wherefrom the owners draw their "reward," and the workers suffer hunger, should be destroyed. The workers on the other hand praised and admired the brave men who sacrificed their own interests to the solidarity of their fighting class-comrades.

Thus different were the ethical conceptions as a consequence of the different class standpoint. Most glaring of all they appeared, in the Press, in the debates which followed therefrom; quite incomprehensibly they opposed one another. It was absolutely impossible to point out to the workers wherein lay the immorality of laying idle the railways for a whole day in the interest of another section of workers. The bourgeois journalist on the other hand said: "One could understand the strike if it were necessary for the preservation of the just interests of the railway workers themselves, but for others out of solidarity! why that was indeed absurd; what would it lead us to if such views became general among the workers?" Perhaps it dawned upon these people that it meant then an end to the systematic process of exploitation. At all events it showed clearly that they had a slight knowledge of the interests of the workers, but proletarian ethics appeared to them as madness.

From this example one can see that really, that alone is accepted as good and moral, which is useful to the community, in this case, the class to which one belongs. This fact must apply generally; thus the experience of to-day gives to us the key to the understanding of the moral conceptions of earlier times and of other peoples. The bourgeois conception was of no assistance in obtaining a knowledge of these things, it could only consider these as results of want of culture, of ignorance, and of barbarism. Our new view teaches us that the moral ideas of such times and peoples arise out of their material requirements of life, and are only to be understood in connexion with these. Their ethical ideas differ from ours because their material conditions of life are different.

Let us take, for example, the Middle Ages, the knights who were the ruling class did not rule over the peasants by means of their money, but through their superiority as warriors, there the knightly morality was at the sword's point, and bravery, and excellence in arms, was the highest form of knightly virtue. Gradually as the bourgeoisie of the

towns increased in numbers and power, with totally different interests; there was an equally marked difference in the moral conceptions of the two classes—as at present. The knights saw in the travelling merchants, with their costly wares or full purses, excellent objects for plundering; the merchants on the other hand had an interest in public safety, and to them what the knights thought a noble, knightly right, appeared to be low, brutal, highway robbery. The burghers had a cogent interest in order, peace, and lawfulness, because their money-making was a peaceful pursuit; the knights asserted their title to the formulating and passing of laws according to the knightly custom and option for retaining their right to plunder. They have indeed not been able to withstand the attacks of other knights who for the bourgeois gold, in the interests of freedom of trade, burnt down the knightly-robber castles. The bourgeois morality obtained the victory. Finally, in the adventures of Don Quixote, the decadent knightly morality appears only as a laughable farce.

The moral conceptions of other peoples are only to be understood from the material needs of their life. There are people who consider it moral to kill their old people. Grossly immoral as this appears to us, they have nevertheless good reason for doing so; shortness of food amongst such tribes compelled them to wander afar, which travels were far too arduous and difficult for the old and decrepit members of the tribe. The tribe had therefore to choose, either to leave them helpless and uncared for, or suffer the whole tribe to become extinct, or to put them to death. But where there obtains an abundance of food, or a more developed form of production, there the conscience, the moral element plays an important part; the old people are held in high esteem, owing to the rich experience and wisdom which they possess, being an important economic power to the tribe. Thus it was with the Semitic people, with their herds of cattle, from whom we receive our fifth commandment, and also with the agricultural Chinese.

Ethics is thus most closely bound up with the mode of production, with the material foundations of the whole social life. Men live not simply for themselves, but form a community; they must therefore have a mutual regard for one another. "The individual man" says Dietzgen, "finds himself defective, inadequate, limited. He requires for his full expression others society, and must consequently, in order to live, let live. The considerations which arise out of mutual necessity are what they sum up under the word moral." These mutual considerations are different according to the different conditions and needs of their society. But these conditions are not arbitrary, but are determined through the relations of production; the "outer" conditions, the development attained by teaching, and the remaining requirements of life determine the order of society. To these externally-given conditions, man must accommodate himself, indeed he cannot do otherwise; and these conditions and requirements consequently determine what he takes into consideration, in

other words, what is moral. Whatever the form of production demands is moral, because it is necessary. Whatever is a necessary requirement of social life under given conditions can never be immoral, however barbaric it may appear to more developed men under different conditions. Thus each order of society produces with iron necessity its own moral conceptions.

There must necessarily arise great misunderstandings when social orders are measured and condemned with a foreign or absolute ethics, as for example the neo-Kantians are wont to do with capitalism. Capitalism is equally as necessary a stage in the development of society as earlier forms of production and can even so little as these be condemned as immoral in an absolute sense. On the other hand it has produced and carried through with force its own peculiar ethics; in its prime it was even considered by the proletariat themselves as moral and brave to work themselves half to death, and to suffer without complaining, the greatest poverty, although in so doing there is nothing virtuous to be discovered, with the exception that it enabled the bourgeoisie to increase their profits and thereby heap up vast accumulations of capital. Whosoever has grasped the necessity of capitalism will also understand why such moral conceptions must of necessity be carried through with it, and why all those ethical diatribes over the immorality and inhumanity of capitalism are nothing but idle rhetoric.

Indeed, capitalism gives, in opposition to other forms of society, a peculiar inducement to such ethical condemnations. For at no other period has there existed, as here, such a sharp and clearly defined opposition between personal and class interest, between the moral law and the practical deed. In capitalism, ethics consists only of being perpetually aggrieved by men; each must fight with all his power for his own personal interest at the expense of the other. Kant had already recognized this when he said that the moral law is not to be discovered in the practice of human actions, he believed therefore that this contradiction between precept and practice was a general characteristic of all ethics, whilst it is in reality only a capitalistic phenomenon. Such an order, wherein the individual always places himself above the society and violates the general social rules for his own private interest must obviously offer to ethical condemnation a wide field of attack. But in so far as these critics fail to place themselves on the ground of the proletarian struggle for the overthrow of capitalism, their diatribes offer only one more contribution to the chapter of bourgeois hypocrisy.

One could perhaps reply to the above remarks, that we ourselves in our propaganda continually criticize and condemn capitalism as an immoral and unjust order of Society. The answer to this objection is that above all things an order of society can be condemned altogether on ethical grounds, but this is only a sign that it has lost its vigour and is approaching its end. When it is generally felt that

capitalism is an immoral order, it only proves that it has outlived itself. It is then condemned from the ground of a higher and better ethics which belongs to a higher approaching form of production. When we brand, with convincing force, capitalism as immoral, it is clear proof that we have in our head and heart a new world-order with whose requirements and ethics we measure capitalism. It is thus far from being conclusive to say that capitalism ought to be displaced by a new order, because it is unjust and immoral. Equally reactionary is it to say: because capitalism can be overthrown, and a better order of society is possible, therefore it is unjust and immoral. Our propaganda does not at all rest upon indignation towards capitalism, but on the knowledge of the necessary tendencies of the development of capitalism. We assert to the worker that a lasting and permanent betterment of his position within the bonds of capitalism is not possible.

The social knowledge, the theory of Socialism for which we have to thank Marx, has thus brought down ethics from its heavenly regions and has unveiled it and shown it to be an earthly affair, an issue of the material conditions of life. But it has thereby not become of less value. It is now most closely bound up with the most important basis of human existence, with the social labour-process, and forms therein to some extent the mental element. The external conditions of this labour-process impose upon men with iron necessity on all hands, hard and difficult toil; hard labour, slavery, damage to life and health. Under the given conditions these were necessary and apt, but how intolerably difficult would this burden have become, if the ethics had not been discovered which transcended this hard necessity into a beautiful, higher, divine law. According to the well-known proverb, mankind has always made a virtue out of necessity, and what formerly was only to be suffered as a dark and dismal necessity was now gladly borne with a light, happy heart, as a virtue. So long as science had not progressed far enough to give to men a clear insight into the necessary laws of society, these laws appear to mankind as a divine law which comes to them from heaven. So long as the instincts, which subordinate the personal interests of man to the general social interests, remain unconscious, mysterious, and unknown; their compelling force must appear as a supernatural, absolute law. This appearance has now disappeared, and we know whence such an instinct comes into our hearts. The proletarian movement has illuminated ethics, through its sciences. On the other hand this new science and ethics throws its light on our own moral feelings. Could we without it doubt now and then, that our new ethical conception, which so often stands in opposition to the honoured conceptions of our fathers, may have originated from a moral error? Our ethics shows to us the reasonableness of our morality, which flows naturally from the necessity of the requirements and conditions of a new society.—*To be continued.*

Translated for the "*Plebs*" Magazine by NUN NICHOLAS.

As a Matter of Fact

IT is a Shavian saying that the advantage in producing books is the opportunity it affords of writing a preface, and in his case the saying is justified by results, but this is not always true of prefaces. Kerr and Co., of Chicago, have proved benefactors of the English-speaking working-class movement in supplying it with translations of many classical works on proletarian theory and practice, but our gratitude is tempered by the fact that these works have often been accompanied by prefaces and other contributions by the translators which, to say the least, are of very doubtful value—Austin Lewis' and Untermann's are cases in point. It should be mentioned that the publishers and writers referred to are not the only sinners in this respect. We purchased from the New York Labour News Co. some time ago copies of *The Paris Commune*, by whom? Marx! No,—Lucien Saniel! Yet all that this gentleman had contributed was a preface—the remainder consisted of copies of the well-known manifestos written by Marx, and issued in the name of the International Workingmen's Association. Could bumptiousness go further? To return to the former subject. Untermann in particular wishes to pose as *the* authority on proletarian theory, corrector of all and sundry—Marx in particular. He has only succeeded in proving that a good translator may be a very indifferent exponent of the theories advanced by authors, some of whose works he has translated. Some of our readers may recollect his attempt to criticize the work of Boudin—*The Theoretical System of Karl Marx*—after that work had appeared as a series of articles in *The International Socialist Review*. How Boudin pulverized his criticisms and compelled him to retreat under the plea of "want of time to go fully into the matter," we also know.

The foregoing remarks are called forth by the statement, contained in our friend Ebby Edwards' article on Dietzgen in last month's magazine, that Marx "does not give a clue to the theory of cognition—the nature of the human faculty of thought—it lacks the basis of a positive philosophy," and that this "one thing lacking" in Marx's philosophy was supplied by Dietzgen. On inquiring of Edwards what authority he had for this statement we are informed—Untermann! Really this is too bad! Surely any shortcomings of Marx could, and should, be proved from *his* writings, not from the mere statements of Untermann, a notoriously inefficient judge, as can easily be proved from *his* writings. Let us see what Engels says on this point in *Feuerbach*:—

We conceived of ideas as materialistic, as pictures of real things, instead of real things as pictures of this or that stage of the absolute idea [Hegel]. Thereupon, the dialectic became reduced to knowledge of the universal laws of motion—as well of man as of the outer world—two sets of laws which are identical as far as matter is concerned but which differ as regards expression, in so far as the mind of man can employ them consciously, while, in nature, and up to now, in human history, for the most part they accomplish themselves, unconsciously in the form of external necessity, through an endless succession of apparent accidents. Hereupon the dialectic of the idea became itself merely the conscious reflex of the dialectic evolution of the real world, and therefore, the dialectic of Hegel was turned upside down, or rather it was placed upon its feet instead of on its head, where it was standing before. And this materialistic dialectic which since that time has been our best tool and our sharpest weapon was discovered, *not by us alone*, but by a German workman, Joseph Dietzgen, in a remarkable manner and utterly independent of us.—Chap. iv.

This was written of Marx and Engels' discoveries in the early forties of the last century. Many more quotations could be given from Marx's own works if necessary. Marx's work in this direction pre-dates Dietzgen's, so there can be no question of the facts in his case. Yet Untermann would have us believe that Marx failed to discover the theory of self-consciousness in its universal relations! Finally, let us quote the following passage from Plechanoff:—

L. BRUMAIRE.

* , * * *

When G. P. Dauge, in his Russian edition of Antonio Labriola's *Socialism and Philosophy*, published the supplement thereto of an American Socialist, Ernest Untermann, it was evidently with the belief in the value of the supplement. He was mistaken.

Untermann's work will bring no enlightenment to Russian readers. Its author is only very superficially acquainted with the subject of which he treated. To convince himself of this, a reader of discretion has only to peruse the following citation, very valuable in its way, from the supplement under discussion:

"The founders of scientific Socialism inverted Hegelian dialectics and transformed it into a practical method of historical research. They had, indeed, squared their accounts with the German classic philosophy and eighteenth and nineteenth century materialism. But they limited themselves from the outset to the practical social implications of their new theory. They had to specialize in order to

accomplish something great, and they selected with keen insight those specialities which bore most directly upon the practical problems of their time. To what extent they had penetrated independently into the problem of cognition before they made this choice no one can know but those comrades who have charge of the unpublished joint manuscript of Marx and Engels written in 1845-46. But it is safe to say that this manuscript would have been published by this time if it contained such a contribution to historical materialism as that supplied by Joseph Dietzgen. This assumption is further strengthened by the fact that Marx and Engels acknowledged Dietzgen's merit, and called him the 'philosopher of the proletariat.' And it is further borne out by the fact that even the latest writings of Engels, such as *Anti-Duering* and *Feuerbach*, in the passages dealing directly with the problems of cognition, free will, moral consciousness, do not contain anything which materially modifies the original conception of human consciousness formulated by Marx."

What did this so-called original conception of human consciousness consist in? Untermann confesses outright that he does not know. Yet, in spite of this, he knows that the founders of scientific Socialism had inverted dialectics, and put it on its feet.

What does it mean, to put dialectics on its feet?

Untermann does not explain. Let us turn to the fountain-head. Marx says: "With Hegel the logical process, which under the name of ideas turns into a real subject, is the demiurg of reality, which in turn is the external phenomenon. With me it is just the contrary. The ideal is material transferred to the human brain and there perfected."

And what does this mean? This is the theory of self-consciousness, and a theory of definite character it is too; the materialistic theory of self-consciousness. E. Untermann has therefore, within easy reach, a statement upon which to form an opinion of the Marxian understanding of self-consciousness, without waiting for the entrance into the world of the as yet unpublished philosophical works of Marx and Engels. But he, it seems, did not even suspect the existence of that statement. Like others, he has continually repeated: "Marx and Engels put dialectics on its feet," completely ignorant of the fact that such a thing could not have been accomplished without the aid of the theory of self-consciousness.

And a very principled writer is E. Untermann to be sure. To tell the truth, he has seemingly good excuse. The Marxian theory has as yet remained undeveloped. But this evil he might have remedied with his own intellectual powers, had he had any. In the words of

Marx just quoted, namely, that, according to Hegel, the logical process always turned into a subject, is contained a thought literally borrowed from Feuerbach; and this circumstance should have reminded E. Untermann of the widely-known fact that Marx evolved his theory by the critical analysis of Feuerbach's philosophy, which, in turn, was evolved by the same process from the philosophy of Hegel. Had E. Untermann taken the pains to acquaint himself with the philosophy of Feuerbach, he would have had ample data at his disposal to judge of the essence of the Marxian theory of self-consciousness. But the gentleman totally failed to get the right information on this subject. Furthermore, the well-known and long-published Marxian thesis on the philosophy of Feuerbach would have proven to our learned author just in what particulars, in Marx's eyes, Feuerbach's philosophy was unsatisfactory. Through this Marxian thesis new data would have offered themselves to our learned author for a proper estimate of Marx's analytics. And had he judiciously used all these data, then the reading of Engel's *Anti-Duering*, and of *Feuerbach* would not have been fruitless, and he would at least have understood that it is positively impossible to enlarge or perfect Marx by Dietzgen's works.

But Untermann has a very slight acquaintance with the Marxian theory, and its philosophical origin was totally unknown to him. And, last but not least, in the realms of philosophy the gentleman is not a dilettante even, but simply a very mediocre figure. It is not surprising, therefore, that he has found it necessary to perfect Marx.

Lately it has become the fashion for any one, considering himself a Marxian, and finding some void in his intellectual horizon, to enlarge and perfect the Marxian theory.

Besides, only from E. Untermann have we got the information that Marx and Engels for ever did away with German classic philosophy and French bourgeois materialism. Very well then, but how did they accomplish that? According to him they did it by utilizing the discoveries of both! German philosophy, following the dialectical method, was completely surfeited with idealism: bourgeois materialism on the other hand almost completely ignored dialectics. Marx and Engels for ever renounced idealism, having made materialism dialectical. But to make materialism dialectical does not yet mean to renounce it. Similarly, to put dialectics on its feet, i.e., make it materialistic, does not mean to do away with dialectics. Of course, the dialectic materialism of Marx and Engels differs in many particulars, for instance, from the French materialism of the eighteenth century. But this difference is simply an unavoidable result of the historic development of materialism itself. The French materialism of the eighteenth century in its turn differed not only from the materialism of Democritus and Epicurus, but from the materialism of Hobbs and Gassendi. That the founders of scientific Socialism did not display the same negligence towards the bourgeois

materialism of the eighteenth century which our erudite Mr. Untermann reveals, is seen from one of Engel's articles in the *Volksstaat*, in which he recommends the French Socialists to acquaint the French proletariat with the "splendid materialistic literature of the eighteenth century."

But Untermann has not the least idea of these facts, and furthermore is proud of it, considering himself too far in advance of Marx and Engels—thanks to Dietzgen. However it be, our author is firmly convinced that the primary (to him completely unknown, as is revealed plainly by his book) Marxian understanding of human self-consciousness has been considerably enlarged on by Dietzgen. What arguments does he bring to fortify his conviction, elucidated by him for the instruction of the "narrow Marxists"? Only a few extracts from the works of Joseph Dietzgen, proving without a doubt that the unusually gifted German workman had great philosophical talent, but which have absolutely not one single theoretical proposition which might have been new in comparison with the works of Marx, Engels, or even Feuerbach. Still, Mr. Untermann naively thinks that his extracts shed a flood of light on the "problem of self-consciousness." Having joined the above-mentioned extracts to a few from the works of the late Antonio Labriola, he self-satisfiedly remarks that this patchwork "reveals at once the characteristic difference in theories." Historical materialism is a result of the development of human society; proletarian "monism" has as its fountain-head "universal nature." This man has read *Feuerbach* and *Anti-Duering*, and has failed to grasp, after all, the fact that historical materialism served only as a means to the dialectical method of sociology, the fountain-head of which appears in "universal nature." Our learned friend, it seems, has not read that part of Engels' introduction to *Anti-Duering*, where the author says that he and Marx transferred materialism into history.

What is "materialism" the product of? It is the product of society. The earth, according to fable, rests on whales, the whales on the water, and the water—on the earth. Plain enough?

[A passage from a critique by George Plechanoff entitled *Joseph Dietzgen*, translated from the Russian for *The Weekly People*, 20-iii-1909, by Jos. Kresswell.]

The martyr cannot be dishonoured. Every lash inflicted is a tongue of flame; every prison a more illustrious abode; every burned book or house enlignens the world; every suppressed or expunged word reverberates through the world from side to side.

—EMERSON.

Money

"IS not 'means of payment' the use value of usurers' money, and how can that interfere with money's being a commodity in usurers' hands, just as 'means of telling time' does not interfere with a watch being a commodity?" is the question asked by a correspondent.

Fain would we tackle the question directly. We confess our inability so to do. We are unable so to do for the same reason that a mathematician will find himself unable to demonstrate directly an error in spheric trigonometry when he perceives the error has its roots in false, plain geometry. The mathematician would have to go all the way back to plain geometry; unravel the initial, and step by step mount up the final kink. We are bound to go back to plain economics, and thence into the elementals of Money, before being able, to a purpose, to unravel the kink in our correspondent's question.

The following rapid sketch, and enunciation of successive principles may clarify the subject.

A commodity has two values—its "use value" and its "exchange value";

The "use value" of a commodity may be various—for instance: the "use value" of a diamond in a glazier's hand is a diamond's quality to cut glass; on the brooch worn by a pretty girl, the "use value" of the diamond is to enhance her attractiveness; on the broad expanse of the shirt-front of a Democratic or Republican Alderman the "use value" of the diamond is to notify possible bribers that the wearer's "price" has risen above a glass of whisky, or a ton of coal; &c., &c.;

The "exchange value" of a commodity is not various; it is ONE;—it consists in the amount of social labour requisite for its production. The "exchange value" of a diamond may rise and fall, according to the increasing or decreasing amount of social labour necessary, at a given time, to produce the diamond; nevertheless, whether high or low, its "exchange value" consists of crystallized labour-power.

Stick a pin there. —

Money has its root in individual production for sale:

Where production is individual, and for sale, commerce or exchange is barter;—value for value.

Direct barter hampers exchange;

1 ' .

Exchange is facilitated by the differentiation of one category of commodities, which, uniting the requisite qualities thereto, serve as the standard of the exchange value for all ;

That category of commodities is the precious metals—gold, especially, and silver ;

The differentiation of the precious metals, as the standard of the exchange value of all commodities, had for its first effect the transforming of direct barter into indirect barter ;

Although indirect, the exchange of goods remains barter, value for value;—no longer diamonds for arms, or food, or cloth ; but diamonds or food or arms, or cloth, for gold or silver, and then silver or gold for diamonds, or food, or cloth, &c. ;

The increased facility of exchange that was born of the transformation of direct barter into indirect, gave birth to a still greater facility in the same direction—coinage, or Money :

Coinage, or Money, saves the time of weighing in the process of exchange ; the seal of organized society takes the place of scales and weights ;

The birth of Money in society is the evidence of the meeting of two streams—the stream of exchange, as just sketched, and the stream of a settling and finally settled political State ;

The meeting of the two streams gives, in turn, birth to a large number of manifestations, some of them "legal fictions" ;

Among these "legal fictions" is that of "legal tender" ;

The Money, pronounced "legal tender" by law, pre-supposes, but does not guarantee "exchange value." The "legal fiction" is that the coin, pronounced "legal tender," contains the "exchange value" that is stamped on its face ;

Hence a radical distinction in Money ;

The same coin, stamped of the "exchange value" of 20 dollars ; therefore, pronounced "legal tender" ; and, therefore, compelling the creditor's acceptance in cancellation of a 20 dollar debt ;—that identical coin can be refused by the identical creditor if offered to him by the identical debtor, not in the cancellation of a debt, but in the course of exchange, in the course of the purchase of some article that the creditor deals in, and the "exchange-value" of which article the creditor estimates at an amount of socially necessary labour-power equal to the labour-power necessary for the production of the amount of gold supposed to be represented by a 20 dollar gold piece. If, for any reason of his own,

the creditor who in this instance figures not as creditor but as seller, believes the 20 dollar gold piece, tendered to him in exchange for his goods, is of less value than the value stamped upon it, he will refuse the exchange. In this capacity he is a lawgiver unto himself, a court of last resort;

Accordingly, and finally, Money has two functions—the function of a “legal tender” enforceable regardless of the actual “exchange value” it may have at the time of payment; in that function Money is a “means of payment,” a creature of law; secondly, the function of facilitating exchange: in that function Money is exclusively an economic entity;

It is so exclusively an economic entity that, all legal stamp notwithstanding, its economic quality is the sole determining factor— if the legal stamp coincides with the economic fact, the coin will pass in the exchange; if the legal stamp and economic fact do not coincide, then the coin will be rejected.

Now, then, combining the two serials of economic principles, and applying them to the question put by our correspondent, it follows that he is in a tangle of false terms:—

1. “Use value,” in economics, is a quality of a COMMODITY. However, various the “use values,” they are inseparable from the COMMODITY, One of the two features of the thing called a commodity is its “exchange value” fact. That fact is not subject to whims, or laws, or legal fictions. He who, accordingly, says, “use value,” also implies “exchange value.”

2. “Money,” as a means of payment of debts, being a legal fiction, a creature of law, lacks the indispensable “exchange value” quality, hence is no COMMODITY, except to use the Marxian witticism, in the sense that “woman’s honour” is a commodity in capitalist society, and has “value”—consequences, pure and simple, of the magic that accompanies capitalist society when it reaches the stage of legal fictions.

3. Not Money is the commodity but the metal of which the coin is minted.

4. It is not the “the means of payment” feature that interferes with Money’s being a commodity. What interferes with Money’s being a commodity is the fact that it is a creature of law enforceable without regard to the “exchange value” feature that marks all commodity.

The failure to grasp these principles is the fruitful source of all manner of economic fallacies.

[From the *Daily People*, New York, January 28, 1911.]

Figment or Philosophy ?

SPENCER has been designated "an out-of-work engineer." He has his adherents. In certain circles, presumably those who have read his Psychology, it is a platitude to say that "ideas are molecular waves, passing over an involved set of nervous plexuses." The other day, whilst we were finishing our 8¼ Marquise, some one was bartering *The Data of Ethics for Sigurd the Volsung*. It was asked if Spencer were out of date. "You never can tell!" However the time for discussion is not now. Perhaps these preliminary remarks appear irrelevant, but call to mind the points we were given to help us to write essays and then the answer may be different. Spencer is serving a laudable purpose. He is the literary point in Hercules and helps in the general orientation.

Last night several thousands flouted all the laws of hygiene. They went to hear Grayson on the Insurance Bill. To-day, however, we are sitting in our chairs on the lawn.

I am writing this a few hours after the above remarks. Now, I do not consider myself to be a superstitious person. I have read Spencer too. Yet there are strange things to account for, and I am loth to admit that primitive feelings dominate, or that primitive ideas can explain. The incident must be recorded and the facts stated if anything approaching an intelligent solution is to be put forward. As for myself I am inclined to accept the intervention of super-physical agents and not supernatural forces as an explanation of what follows.

The present summer has been distinguished by fine weather. During the particular day referred to the sun shone brilliantly, scorchingly in the exposed places, creating an almost insufferable heat in the shade of the trees where we were sitting. As the heat became more oppressive the ladies retired indoors, and feeling drowsy myself, I prepared to take a quiet sleep. I had barely closed my eyes when a strange feeling that someone was near came over me, a feeling intensified when I heard the murmur of voices, apparently close at hand. Opening my eyes, I expected to see the ladies returning. Imagine my astonishment when, instead of my sisters and their friends, I saw four men, clad in a fantastic garb, apparently floating in the air and coming slowly to earth. They advanced towards me and the tallest spoke in a low musical voice, a language which sounded like a mixture of Italian and Japanese. Seeing that he was not understood he placed in my hand a strip of material covered with grotesque cabalistic signs. I looked at this strange document intently for a few minutes, and then raised my head and found to my dismay that my strange visitors had vanished. After hastily looking round the garden I ran to the house; not a sign of them. An

uninterrupted view showed no one crossing the fields, so off I went down to the station and found the proverbial porter that is to be seen at country stations. The information elicited was, there had been no trains and no such visitors. Wondering, interested and baffled, I retraced my steps and found the peculiar packet still on my chair where I had dropped it. That night I pondered over the manuscript and extracted some of its cryptic meaning. In the morning I took it to a friend and we ultimately unravelled the message of the hieroglyphics. Much of the matter is extraneous. Sections were technical and generally uninteresting. Other portions were explanatory of the visitors themselves and call for a more general treatment than is at present possible. A fragment which was directly applicable is given in full. The other portions may be made public soon. As matters are at present my friend and I do not care to incur any undue responsibility by premature publication of things which would be far reaching in their influence, and probably reverse the bases of individual and social practice. Here is the manuscript.

"Deep asleep it lies, the still city of Oxford. The sound of bells comes eerily on the night air. The several clock towers knell the mystic hour of midnight. Across the meadows goes the black shadow of a bat, ominous omen. Here slumbering below us is the City of Hush. The moonbeams have woven their fetters of pale fire. The Isis and Cherwell and the deviating waterways hold the town in a network of silver. Away over house top and college spire, the water still swishes and swirls through the rushes and sedges. On, on, with current and eddy it goes past Godstow Priory. The Priory is no longer a ruin. The whole structure gleams with a soft light. The mournful cadences of the Liturgy is heard chanted by voices mysterious and low. A strange movement is seen. Unseen hands fling back the ponderous doors. In cowl and holy garb the ghostly forms wend their way through the darkened cloisters. The music irradiates. Coloured streams of light from the stained windows pour upon the grass, disclosing the Elf King and his subjects holding their revels. The Fairies and Brownies are swaying the trees, and the Rustling Leaves are telling their dreams to the Feathered Folk. The water's eternal music is broken by the gentle lapping, and from the whirlpool's inky depths there come the gleams from the minarets and towers of The City of the Flowing Water. Stars rush and blaze in the Milky Way, and the Great Bear swings across the sky like it has done probably for millions of years. They have seen strange things these celestial fireflies. Pale and wan, they have attended the birth-pangs of other worlds. They have flickered and gleamed at the dying agony of Solar Souls. Their light fell aslant the earth before History's Dawn, reddened and blazed when Empires rose and fell. The Physical Era progressed and still they maintain their lambent fire in this, the Subhi Sâdik of Man."

Here the MS. deals with "Eco Nomics," which appears to be a theory of Social Re-Incarnation, and then goes on as follows :

"This is our age. Our existence is not measured by the figures on a dial! We are as old as the stars who watched our birth, and as young as the butterfly that flew in the morning's sunshine. We are the psychic personalities of they who sleep below. To them we are known as L. Brumaire, F. J. C., Jules Benedick and the Watchman. We belong to the vast army of Nom de Plumes, secret agents of the Intelligence Department and to-night we meet in a sub-conscious conclave. For a brief while we unite. We know not our next meeting. Perchance Conditions may soon annihilate us or condemn us like the Jew to wander amidst the arid deserts and stony places of the Physical. We staked our all on 'one crowded hour of glorious life.' Brumaire swept the hillside of History and plucked blooms for the 'trampling millions.' F. J. C. probed deep; 'Political Economy is the Anatomy of Civic Society.' His arguments cut deep and clean, and rid the body politic of its cancerous growth. With humour, epigram and satire Jules Benedick regaled the gathering and etheralized us with an evolutionary Nocturne. The Watchman told of the passing hosts; of their leaders and panoply of war; of their knightly carriage and battle array; of the marauding bands who tried to cut off the stragglers; of the all-conquering army; of the final victory. So the time sped. On the morrow was the Meet and then we might be parted for ever. Suddenly the Watchman told of the approaching Dawn. Far below a sleeper moved uneasily in his sleep and F. J. C. was no longer with us. Soon several of the men were astir and I found myself alone. A ray of gold pierced the mists and . . ."

Here the manuscript ends somewhat abruptly and leaves us to conjecture that the Physical Master of the narrator awoke. However, it is only another supposition added to the rest. Were the four forms which I had seen, they of whom the record speaks, or had the originals, of whom there appears to have been five, been annihilated by the Conditions they dreaded? Were my visitors the messengers sent to tell us, the modern Horatios, of the things which are not dreamt of in our philosophy? Must we be compelled to go to the Author? "He knows about it all—He knows—*He* knows."

MEREDITH F. TITTERINGTON.

It matters not how deep entrenched the wrong,
 How hard the battle goes, the day how long;
 Faint not, fight on; to-morrow comes the song;
 Be strong, be strong.—M. D. BABCOCK.